- Dicembre 20, 2020
On July 18, 2005, then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited Washington and, in a joint statement with George W. Bush, India and the United States, agreed to conclude a civil nuclear agreement. More than 150 non-proliferation activists and anti-nuclear organizations have called for a strengthening of the initial NST agreement to prevent the current global non-proliferation regime from being undermined.  In 2009, the United States negotiated and signed new agreements with the United Arab Emirates (known for their “gold standard”) and Vietnam in 2014 and signed new agreements to replace existing agreements with Australia in 2010, Taiwan in 2013 (including the “gold standard”), China and South Korea in 2015 and Norway in 2016. The “gold standard” provisions concern a country that declares itself ready to forego the enrichment and reprocessing of nuclear materials. Brahma Chellaney, a professor of strategic studies at the New Delhi-based Centre for Policy Research, argued that the text of the U.S. exception was intended to irrevocably anchor New Delhi in the nuclear-weapons non-proliferation regime. He argued that India would be placed under a wider non-proliferation network, with India bound by compliance with all NSG rules. India would agree to transform its unilateral moratorium into multilateral legality.
He concluded that instead of the “complete” civil nuclear cooperation promised by the initial agreement of 18 July 2005, India`s access to civilian nuclear enrichment and reprocessing technologies would be limited by the initial abandonment of the NSGs.  July 18, 2005: President Bush and Prime Minister Singh announce for the first time in Washington their intention to conclude a nuclear agreement. Agreement 123 sets the conditions for bilateral civil nuclear cooperation and requires separate authorizations from the U.S. Congress and cabinet ministers. The agreement will also help India meet its goal of increasing nuclear capacity by 25,000 MW by 2020 through imports of nuclear reactors and fuels.  25 July 2008: The IAEA secretariat informs member states of the Indian-specific safeguard agreement. 4. The provisions of this article are implemented in such a way as to avoid inappropriate interference in the peaceful nuclear activities of the parties and to respect the prudent management practices necessary for the safe and economic implementation of their peaceful nuclear programs. 1. Plutonium and uranium 233 (with the exception of what may be contained in spent fuel) and highly enriched uranium, transferred or used or produced in material or equipment transmitted under this agreement, may be stored in facilities that are at least subject to the levels of protection defined in INEA INFCIRC 225/REV 4, as they can be reviewed and accepted by the parties. Each contracting party notes these entities on a list made available to the other party. The list of a contracting party is treated confidentially if that party requires it.
Each party can make changes to its list by notifying the other party in writing and receiving written confirmation. This confirmation must be made no later than thirty days after receiving the notification and is limited to the finding of receipt of the notification. If there is reason to believe that the provisions of this sub-article are not fully respected, immediate consultation may be necessary.